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Abstract 
This paper considers the interconnections between the nature and organisation of work and 
the level of unemployment. We consider how actions taken at the workplace level can 
impede as well as facilitate the reduction in unemployment. We also consider how the 
workplace may be reformed to overcome some of the obstacles, economic as well as political, 
to full employment. Finally, we examine the impacts of the current finance-dominated 
capitalism on work organization and workers. Our view is that financialization represents a 
major barrier to full employment not least because of its tendency to limit real investment but 
also because of its negative effects on the bargaining power of workers. 
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Workplace relations, unemployment and finance-dominated capitalism 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Relations at the workplace level have important and far-reaching impacts at the 
macroeconomic level. The choice of technology within workplaces, on the one hand, can lead 
to more general shifts in the level and distribution of employment. The polarisation of the 
labour market and the rise of low and high quality jobs, for example, have been linked to 
technological shifts within and across workplaces. The management of labour, on the other 
hand, can impact on labour market outcomes. Where employers rely on the threat of 
unemployment to discipline workers, then this can provide a powerful tendency against the 
achievement of full employment. Where employers use alternative methods of labour 
management that do not depend on the threat of unemployment, the scope for achieving full 
employment may be considered to be much greater. 
 
In this paper, we consider the interconnections between the nature and organisation of work 
and the level of unemployment. We consider how actions taken at the workplace level can 
impede as well as facilitate policy action aimed at reducing unemployment . We also consider 
how the workplace reform is central to overcoming some of the obstacles, economic as well 
as political, to full employment. Finally, we examine the impacts of the current finance-
dominated capitalism on work organisation. Our view is that financialization represents a 
major barrier to full employment not least because of its tendency to limit real investment but 
also because of its negative effects on the bargaining power of workers. 
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2. Unemployment and labor productivity 
 
The link between unemployment and labor productivity has been explored from different 
vantage points in economics. In this section, we focus on three different accounts from 
mainstream economics, post-Keynesian economics and Marxian political economy. We draw 
out their underlying assumptions and ideas especially in relation to the nature and extent of 
workplace conflict. We also trace their implications for policymaking. 
 
2.1 Mainstream economicsWKHµVKLUNLQJ¶EDUULHUWRIXOOHPSOR\PHQW 
 
We start with an account of the unemployment-labor productivity relation found in 
mainstream economics. This account is associated with efficiency wage theory that has 
become a key aspect of New Keynesian macroeconomics as well as mainstream 
microeconomic accounts of workplace relations. It can be noted here that efficiency wage 
theory has been instrumental in opening-up mainstream economics to an analysis of the 
internal organisation of work. In the past, as is well-known, mainstream economics consigned 
the internal affairs of the workplace to a black box. How work was organized and how work 
was extracted from workers were neglected in mainstream economics. Efficiency wage 
theory has helped to remedy this longstanding neglect; specifically, it has shown how 
workplace relations play a key role in determining macroeconomic outcomes most notably 
the existence and persistence of involuntary unemployment. 
 
Efficiency wage theory comes in several different forms (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1986); here 
we focus on one particular example, namely the so-FDOOHGµVKLUNLQJ¶PRGHORI Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984). This model takes its name from the fact that it assumes that workers will 
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µVKLUN¶LHH[SHQG]HURHIIRUWLIWKH\GRQRWIHHOWKUHDWHQHGE\WKHSURVSHFWRIMREORVV7KH
threat of job loss is assumed to vary positively with the financial penalty incurred by workers 
in the event of their dismissal for being caught underperforming at work. Employers are then 
assumed to face incentives to raise wages above outside opportunities to increase the cost of 
job loss. If all employers act in this way, then wages will be bid-up to a level where there is 
an excess supply of labour. This excess supply of labour creates the deterrent that employers 
need to prevent shirking by workers.1 Although unemployed workers will be ready and 
willing to work for lower wages than those currently paid to incumbent workers, they will not 
be hired by employers because their reemployment will eliminate unemployment and hence 
the cost of job loss. Those workers who face unemployment, in this case, are seen as 
involuntarily unemployed: they are ready and willing to work, but are not hired because their 
employment would result in lower labor SURGXFWLYLW\7KHµHIILFLHQF\ZDJH¶DVSHFWDULVHV
from the fact that employers are able to reduce unit labour cost by paying higher wages: 
while it costs employer more to hire workers, this cost can be more recouped via higher labor 
productivity from a compliant workforce. 
 
We need to be clear about how the above arguments are arrived at. They are based on several 
assumptions, some of which are controversial and open to challenge. The most contentious 
DVVXPSWLRQLVWKDWZRUNHUVDUHµVKLUNHUV¶,WLVDVVXPHGWKDWZRUNHUVDUHERUQWRUHVLVWZRUN
and will only work if incentivized to do so. This idea is applied indiscriminately, as if all 
workers are alike in their resistance to work. 
 
                                                          
1
 Efficiency wage theory sees unemployment as a supply-side problem and retains the same labour supply and 
labour demand framework as standard neoclassical theory. This is in contrast to heterodox perspectives which 
see wages as determined by political, historical and social factors (see Botwinick, 1993, for a detailed 
exposition). 
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The problem, of course, is that the preferences for work of workers are not fixed; rather they 
are influenced by the social and institutional context of work. If workers resist work, this is 
likely to reflect on the harsh conditions they face at work. Such resistance may also be a 
response to the exploitation of employers. The focus on the alleged shirking proclivities of 
individual workers tends to mask these others sources of resistance to work; indeed, it tends 
to paint workers as the reason for conflict at work, thereby detracting from the potentially 
exploitative behaviour of employers. 
 
The argument about involuntary unemployment being a consequence of the shirking 
behaviour of individual workers gives the impression that full employment is denied because 
of a problem inherent in human nature (or at least the nature of workers). It appears that full 
employment is an unachievable goal, owing to the natural tendency for workers to shirk when 
involuntary unemployment is zero. Society, it seems, must resign itself to involuntary 
unemployment as a worker disciplinary device. Involuntary unemployment, it is argued, is 
necessary and indeed desirable to achieve high labour productivity. 
 
The shirking model ultimately offers a counsel of despair. Invoking the assumption of 
universal shirking by workers, it presents full employment as an unrealisable policy goal. 
Ideologically, the model becomes a tool for justifying the existence and persistence of 
involuntary unemployment. 
 
2.2 Post-Keynesian economics: Kalecki and the political obstacles to full employment 
 
In post- Keynesian economics, the emphasis on deficient aggregate demand as a barrier to 
full employment is well-known. Keynes emphasized that, without an adequate level of 
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aggregate demand, capitalist economies would languish in a state of involuntary 
unemployment. It was the job of the State to run budget deficits and to reflate the economy 
where WKHµanimal spirits¶ of the private sector were low. Yet, there are other aspects to the 
post-Keynesian account of full employment. One aspect of interest to us is the emphasis 
given to the political obstacles to full employment. This aspect is more associated with 
Kalecki than Keynes. Indeed the link to Kalecki means going beyond Keynes in that the 
explanation for the obstacles to full employment requires consideration of the class politics of 
capitalism. Following Kalecki, it can be argued that even if aggregate demand policies could 
gain the support of the State their implementation would be resisted by capitalists out of a 
fear of their adverse effects on the balance of power in the workplace. KaleckL¶V key 
contribution was to show how full employment policies would be blocked by capitalists due 
to their desire to maintain their power over workers in the workplace. 
 
Kalecki¶VDUJXPHQWVRQ the political obstacles to full employment are laid out in an article he 
wrote in 1943. He argued that capitalists favoured unemployment because it helped them to 
NHHSµGLVFLSOLQHLQWKHIDFWRULHV¶The threat of unemployment made incumbent workers more 
unwilling to resist the demands of capitalists. It not only suppressed calls for higher wages 
but also quelled resistance to long work hours and high work intensity. Unemployment, 
Kalecki argued, suited the economic as well as political interests of the capitalist class. 
 
Capitalists would clearly benefit from the achievement of full employment. The latter was 
associated not only with buoyant demand but also with higher profits that could be used to 
fund further investment and growth. But the negative political implications of the 
maintenance of full employment presented too much of a risk to the capitalist class. The 
prospect of workers gaining greater power and using this power to challenge the prevailing 
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social order made the capitalist class resist the achievement and then maintenance of full 
employment. In practical terms, this meant that capitalists would press the State not to enact 
aggregate demand policies that would help to achieve full employment. It also meant that if 
full employment happened to be achieved capitalists would press the State to deflate the 
economy in order to increase unemployment.2 
 
.DOHFNL¶V argument is profound in the sense that it implies that full employment will be 
prevented by the force of class politics. Thus, even though full employment may be possible 
and achievable in practice, it will be rendered impossible by the interventions of the capitalist 
class whose interests are better achieved by the maintenance of mass unemployment. 
Needless to say, we are presented here with a very different vision of the world to that found 
in efficiency wage theory. The problem of persistent unemployment is linked not to the 
shirking behaviour of individual workers but to the influence of naked class power. The 
thwarting of full employment at root is about capitalists wanting to maintain their power over 
workers, not some problem of natural slothfulness on the part of workers. Achieving and 
maintaining full employment, in this case, requires that we consider how society is governed 
± more specifically, it challenges us to think of new institutional arrangements that are able to 
broker a class accord between capital and labour without the back-up threat of 
XQHPSOR\PHQW.DOHFNL¶VPHVVDJHLVWKDWZLWKRXWµIXQGDPHQWDOUHIRUP¶WRWDFNOHHQWUHQFKHG
class power, capitalist society is doomed to suffer unemployment. What form such reform 
might take is taken up below.  
                                                          
2
 Kalecki (p.326) argued that capitalists would be particularly opposed to welfare spending and 
VXEVLGLHVRIFRQVXPSWLRQJRRGVµ7KHIXQGDPHQWDOVRIFDSLWDOLVWHWKLFVUHTXLUHWKDW³<RXVKDOOHDUQ
\RXUEUHDGLQVZHDW´¶, which ruled out such policies from their perspective. By contrast, Kalecki 
noted that not all public investment would necessarily be opposed, only those parts competing with 
private investment. The idea that full employment policies might be tolerated by capitalists as long as 
they do not generate ODERU³LQGLVFLSOLQH´DQGhence undermine profitability is developed by Moudud 
and Martinez-Hernandez (2014). 
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2.3 Marxian political economy: the µreserve army RIODERU¶   
  
The ideas of Kalecki on unemployment were shaped by those of Marx, particularly his notion 
RIDµUHVHUYHDUP\RIODERU¶$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVQRWLRQDVXUSOXVRUUHVHUYHDUP\RI
unemployed workers is required by capitalists to moderate and curb the desires and 
pretensions of the active or employed workforce. Marx argued that unemployment was 
functional to capitalism; without the threat of unemployment, capitalists would not be able to 
police the workforce in ways that meet their class interests. 
 
For Marx, unemployment was a result of capital accumulation in general and of the 
centralisation and mechanisation of production in particular. The uneven nature of economic 
development over time and across industries, together with the emergence of new branches of 
production, led to a fluctuating reserve army of unemployed workers. But unemployment 
remained an ever-present feature of capitalism, enabling the expansion of production as well 
as the emergence of new industries. Unemployment, in essence, was functional to capitalism; 
it provided the means necessary for capitalists to reorganize and restructure production in 
ways that generate surplus value. 
 
A key reason why unemployment existed and persisted under capitalism, according to Marx, 
was because of developments in technology. Marx argued that capitalists would use 
technology to extract more surplus value from workers and the outcome of this would be job 
losses. Technologically induced unemployment then added to the pressure on the employed 
to expend more unpaid labor time. In this sense, Marx viewed unemployment as both a 
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systemic outcome of the capitalist mode of production and a necessary foundation for it; it 
ZDVERWKWKHµSURGXFW¶DQGµOHYHU¶RIcapital accumulation (Marx 1976, p.784). 
 
The resistance of workers to low wages, shorter working hours, and better working 
conditions had to be overcome by the threat of unemployment. Marx saw that capitalists were 
in conflict with workers and they would use the reserve army of the unemployed to tip the 
balance of power in their favor. As we saw with Kalecki above, Marx believed that capitalist 
class conflict resulted in unemployment. But, unlike Kalecki, Marx was pessimistic that 
much could be done to reform capitalism in ways that could facilitate the achievement of full 
HPSOR\PHQW$Q\µIXQGDPHQWDOUHIRUP¶XQGHUFDSLWDOLVPZDVGRRPHGWRIDLOXUH
Unemployment was an endemic problem under capitalism and the idea of full employment 
capitalism was an oxymoron. Only by ridding society of class conflict and thus going beyond 
capitalism could we envisage achieving an outcome where everyone could be fully and 
meaningfully employed.     
 
3. Workplace requirements for sustainable full employment 
 
The above section highlighted the nexus between workplace relations and unemployment. 
The management of conflict at work, in particular, can lead to the maintenance and 
reproduction of unemployment at the aggregate level and can be an active force preventing 
the attainment of full employment. This raises the issue of how work is organized and 
whether work can be reorganized to reduce the necessity for unemployment as a threat to 
workers. Can workplaces be reorganized in a way that allows for lower unemployment 
without lower labor productivity? This nexus between unemployment and labor productivity 
has not been well-explored in the economics literature; much more attention has been given 
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to the unemployment-inflation nexus. One contribution of this paper is to highlight the need 
for further exploration of the unemployment-labor productivity nexus. Such exploration can 
help in addressing the broader workplace requirements for sustainable full employment, a 
topic we address below.  
 
Taking efficiency wage theory first, it gives the impression that policies aimed at reforming 
work are limited in scope. Such reforms are effectively reduced to better monitoring systems 
and stronger incentive schemes. Because all workers are assumed to be shirkers, stress is 
placed on limiting the discretionary power of workers and on incentivizing workers not to 
slack-off at work. The suggestion that reforms can be used to increase the discretion and 
autonomy of workers over work is dismissed on the basis that such reforms will encourage 
ZRUNHUVWRVKLUN:HDUHSUHVHQWHGZLWKDYLVLRQRIWKHZRUOGLQZKLFKWKHXVHRIµFDUURWDQG
VWLFN¶LVWKHRQO\RSWLRQIRUDFKLHYLQJKLJKlabor productivity.  
 
Efficiency wage theory effectively asks us to accept the existence and persistence of 
involuntary unemployment as the price for combatting shirking by individual workers. Note 
it blames workers for unemployment, not employers ± unemployment is at root a problem 
linked to the alleged indolence of individual workers. In turn, it blames workers for 
preventing the reform of work in ways that could potentially improve the quality of work. 
Workers must accept tightly controlled work and the imposition of hard incentives ± two 
features of low quality work ± as the price for their own indolence.  
 
But what if the effects of unemployment on labor productivity are not always positive? What 
if unemployment can limit labor productivity below potential levels? There are dangers in an 
excessive focus on the functional role of unemployment as a threat to spur worker effort. 
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There may well be some relationship, but this is too crude a reading of how work motivation 
is managed and determined in the real world. The factors that generate high labor 
productivity in actual workplaces are more complex than abstract carrot and stick models 
would suggest and excessive use of such threat tactics may actually undermine labor 
productivity.  
 
The shirking model of efficiency wages and involuntary unemployment discussed above 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) assumes that unemployment is an effective device for 
disciplining workers given the assumption that workers possess a universal proclivity to 
shirk. Such an approach takes a one-sided view of production and of human nature, leading to 
a failure to consider the downsides of the threat effect in terms of reduced labor productivity. 
The possibility of job loss may well assist firms in gaining the compliance of workers but 
what about the ingenuity and creativity of workers? ConWUDU\WRWKHHFRQRPLVW¶VVWDQGDUG
YLHZRISURGXFWLRQWKHUHOHDVHDQGKDUQHVVLQJRIZRUNHUV¶LQJHQXLW\DQGFUHDWLYLW\SOD\VD
crucial role in determining labor productivity (see for example Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 
1990). 
 
There is a crucial difference to bHGUDZQKHUHEHWZHHQµFRQVHQW¶DQGµFRRSHUDWLRQ¶&RQVHQW
to work entails an acceptance of the authority of employers and compliance to any set rules 
and procedures. Both can be secured by issuing threats of dismissal. Cooperation, by contrast, 
entails a dHHSHUVRXUFHRIFRPPLWPHQWWRZRUNDQGDZLOOLQJQHVVWRµJRWKHH[WUDPLOH¶IRU
employers. It means that workers seek out better ways of doing their work ± such 
experimentation can aid employers in revealing better ways of doing work. It can also mean 
workers coming forward with new ideas about how to change work in ways that can enhance 
labor productivity and allowing workers to use their initiative to find the best way. Where 
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workers are encouraged to use their voice at work, labor productivity can be improved. Much 
EHWWHULQWKLVFDVHWKDWZRUNHUVXVHWKHLUµYRLFH¶WKDQVKRZWKHLUIUXVWUDWLRQDQGGLVFRQWHQW
ZLWKZRUNE\H[HUFLVLQJWKHLUULJKWWRµH[LW¶WKHLUFXUUHQWMREV7KHSRLQWKHUHZRXOGEHWKDW
while unemployment helps to secure the consent of workers it does not help ± and indeed 
hinders ± the elicitation of their cooperation. An unintended and hidden cost of higher 
unemployment is lower cooperation that can translate into lower overall labor productivity. 
The loss of labor productivity may occur where the threat of unemployment by employers is 
SHUFHLYHGE\ZRUNHUVDVDEUHDFKRIWUXVWDQGDORVVRIFRQILGHQFHLQZRUNHUV¶SUHYLRXV
contributions. In short, far from helping to achieve high labor productivity, high 
unemployment may well thwart its achievement. 
 
The grain of truth in efficiency wage theory is that the threat of unemployment can be and 
often is used by employers to discipline workers. There is some evidence of a link between 
unemployment and workplace performance. An early study of the efficiency wage model in 
the UK by Wadhwani and Wall (1991), for example, found some evidence of a threat effect: 
higher unemployment raised workplace productivity. More recently, Lazear et al. (2013) 
have explored the impact of the 2007-09 recession on worker productivity in the US. Based 
on a detailed analysis of one national technology-based services firm, they found that worker 
productivity (as captured by the computers used by workers) rose in the recession as retained 
employees worked harder.3 
 
                                                          
3
 The accumulated empirical evidence for the so-called µZDJH-FXUYH¶DQHJDWLYHWUDGH-off between local 
unemployment and wage levels, is also often taken to be supportive of  efficiency wage theory (e.g. 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995). From this perspective, a higher level of local unemployment would mean that 
firms have to rely less on wage incentives to maintain the cost of job loss. However, at this level of analysis, the 
observed relationship could also be explained in Marxian terms, reflecting an imbalance of power in the labor 
market. 
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However, the above study focuses only on one firm. Other studies using a broader set of data 
have shown that the threat effect of unemployment varies according to the nature of the 
industry and employment relations within it (in line with post-Keynesian and Marxian 
analysis). From an aggregate, cross-national perspective, Weisskopf (1987) found that the 
relationship between unemployment and labor productivity varied across economies 
according to the nature of the industrial relations system in place. In the adversarial systems 
of the US and UK, a generally positive association was found, in contrast to a negative 
relationship in the more corporatist systems of Sweden and Germany. Such variations have 
also been found in within-country studies. Green and Weisskopf (1990) examined differences 
in the impact of unemployment on work intensity across US manufacturing industries 
between 1958 and 1981. In over half their sample, they found evidence of a positive and 
VLJQLILFDQWµZRUNHUGLVFLSOLQHHIIHFW¶IURPXQHPSOR\PHQW. Yet, importantly, they also 
reported significant differences in the nature of this effect across industries, according to their 
structure and employment practices. In those characterized by large firm size, concentrated 
product markets, high wages and high union density ± all indicators of primary labor market 
status ± the threat effect from unemployment was found to be relatively weak. In contrast, 
unemployment was found to have the strongest impact in industries dominated by small, 
rivalrous, labor intensive firms operating in secondary labor markets. Further evidence that 
threat effects are more prevalent within secondary labor market firms, where unions are 
poorly represented, is reported by Green and McIntosh (1998) for Britain and by Rebitzer 
(1988) for the US. 
 
What the above research shows is that the threat of job loss is not required to secure high 
labor productivity and that alternative, often unionized, arrangements can provide a substitute 
to underpin high labor productivity. However, in many workplaces, employers do rely on 
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unemployment, but this would appear to be more for reasons of power ± a conscious choice 
to follow an insecure, intensive secondary labor market route ± rather than an efficient 
response to some universal problem inherent in human nature. That is, it is possible for 
employers to raise labor productivity by relying on other (non-coercive) means to motivate 
workers; however, the challenge that the loss of the unemployment threat potentially poses 
for their power in the workplace leads them to insist on its maintenance, even if this means 
foregoing productivity gains.4 
 
The productivity loss here is relative to some other type of work organisation that does not 
rely on the threat of unemployment to raise labor productivity. Here we can think of types of 
work organisation WKDWHOLFLWZRUNHUV¶FRRSHUDWLRQE\JUDQWLQJWKHPgreater autonomy over 
work and greater participation in decision-making. The starting point for this approach is not 
the image of the µlazy worker¶ who will use any discretionary power to avoid the exertion and 
responsibility of work. Rather, it is WKHLGHDWKDWZRUNHUV¶HIIRUWis endogenous and positively 
related to the autonomy they have over work and their involvement in the workplace. 
Workers thus may respond to having more autonomy over work by seeking out innovations 
in the way they do work; they may also feel more confident to put forward their ideas about 
how to improve labor productivity. Cooperation, though, will only be forthcoming where the 
right conditions hold. Conditions where workers and employers are at loggerheads, or in 
dispute, will obviously not be conducive to the extension of ZRUNHUV¶autonomy over work. In 
such conditions, consent by threat may represent the only option open to employers. But this 
does not mean that alternative conditions could not be created. Indeed, the argument here 
would be that such alternative conditions need to be created if unemployment is to lose its 
                                                          
4
 The US retail sector provides some telling examples: Cascio FRQWUDVWV:DOPDUW¶VORZ-wage, high 
turnover business model with that of Costco, where employee benefits are higher and conditions better, without 
adverse performance consequences; Guy (2003) concludes that the failure of other retailers to follow SDIHZD\¶V
adoption of high involvement work practices is likely rooted in a desire to maintain control; firms sacrifice 
efficiency based on the perception that to do otherwise would reduce profits. See also Pfeffer (2007).  
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status as a worker disciplinary device. Policies for sustainable full employment, in short, must 
include policies to reform the workplace. 
 
The burgeoning literature on the connections between workplace structures and practices and 
performance in the fields of industrial relations and human resource management provides 
evidence of the positive impact that participatory practices such as worker involvement and 
job autonomy can have on labor productivity (Strauss, 1998; Ichniowski et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 
2007). This literature is suggestive of the type of reforms required to achieve high labor 
productivity without high unemployment. Yet, so-called µhigh performance¶ practices remain 
relatively limited in actual workplaces. This seems puzzling. If such practices can raise labor 
productivity, why are they not more widespread? Following our previous line of argument, 
one reason why employers may reject these practices is because of fear of losing control of 
the workplace. Pfeffer (2007) suggests that this might be the case, when he refers to the 
distorting influence of financial stakeholders on labor management. These stakeholders have 
biased investments towards short-term cost cutting exercises and away from long-term 
investment in employee involvement schemes. Hallock (2009) has also pointed to the 
LQFUHDVLQJLPSDFWRIFRVWFRQWURORQ86ILUPV¶HPSOR\PHQWGHFLVLRQV. Thompson¶V (2003) 
µdisconnected capitalism thesis¶, in addition, suggests that short-term pressures from finance 
prevent the adoption and spread of high performance management practices. In sum, whilst it 
appears that more progressive ways of achieving and sustaining labor productivity exist and 
may be implemented in practice, it is clear that analysis needs to look beyond the level of the 
workplace to understand the scope for reform. Issues of power, in particular, remain 
important in understanding the barriers to the reform of work in ways that would help 
facilitate the pursuit of full employment. 
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4. The financialization of labor: normalising lower investment and lower quality work  
 
This section considers, in brief, the extent to which developments in modern finance have 
provided a fetter to improved work conditions and macroeconomic outcomes. We focus in 
particular on the rise of a financialized capitalism. The process of financialization has 
transformed the investment strategies of firms. It has also led to shifts in the organisation of 
work that have had specific detrimental consequences for labor, as we will show below. 
 
The term µfinancialization¶ originates in radical political economy and is used to describe in a 
systematic way the dramatic rise of financial activities and financial institutions within 
economy, society, and culture. Financialization has been a secular and global process over the 
past 30 years or so, recently encompassing the global financial crisis and ensuing period of 
austerity in capitalist societies. Different meanings are attached to it and this section cannot 
review all these different meanings (for such a review, see Lapavitsas, 2011). Some broad 
characteristics of financialization, however, can be identified. One key aspect of 
financialization concerns the enormous increase in the role and importance of finance and 
financial activities in the economies of mature capitalist nations, particularly the US and UK 
(Epstein, 2005). This increase has not been cost-free, but instead has come at the expense of a 
decline in the industrial sectors of these nations. The spread and consolidation of speculative 
behaviour and a short-termism culture has ultimately placed limits on real investment, output, 
and growth. Large corporations, in particular, have undergone a process of financialization as 
they have looked to engage more in financial activities (e.g. use of hedge funds, lending to 
households). These corporations have also funded investment more by internal sources than 
by loans from banks. This fact has meant that banks have had to adapt their behaviour, 
focusing more on lending to households as a means to secure revenue (Lapavitsas, 2011). The 
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HYHU\GD\OLYHVRISHRSOHPRUHJHQHUDOO\KDYHEHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJO\µILQDQFLDOizeG¶0DUWLQ
2002). A combination of factors ± e.g. declining or slowly growing real wages, the 
privatisation of public services, and the entrenchment of a consumer culture based on mass 
advertising ± KDYHPHDQWWKDWSHRSOHV¶OLYHVKDYHEHFRPHPRUHERXQG-up in the financial 
system. Borrowing to fund consumption and investment in financial assets (e.g. housing, 
pensions, insurance) have become a more normal and accepted part of everyday life 
(Lapavitsas, 2011, p.620). The stagnation of real wages coupled with the acceleration in 
incomes of financiers has also resulted in rising levels of inequality (Glyn, 2006).  
Financialization, finally and critically, is linked to the global economic crisis that began in 
2007: the rise of finance and financial speculation is seen to have created an unsustainable 
bubble that has burst with devastating effects in the post-2007 era. The process of 
financialization has been uneven across capitalist nations; it has been most evident in nations 
such as the US and UK and has been less apparent in other nations like Germany. The recent 
global economic crisis, however, has meant that all nations have been exposed to the effects 
of financialization.  
  
For our purposes, the interesting issue concerns the consequences for work and work 
relations of financialization. Here we attempt to develop and apply some arguments made 
HOVHZKHUH/DSDYLWVDV7KRPSVRQ*O\Q2¶6XOOLYDQ)RXULVVXHV
can be stressed. Firstly, financialization has impacted directly on the employment 
relationship. Specifically, it has enabled employers to increase their power over workers. As 
workers have accumulated financial assets and taken on greater amounts of debt, they have 
become less able and willing to push for higher wages and better working conditions. To the 
contrary, their weakened economic position has made them more vulnerable to real wage 
cuts, longer work hours, and more precarious forms of employment (Glyn, 2006). Higher 
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personal debt ratios increase the vulnerability of those in work and the desperation of those 
without.  
 
Secondly, financialization KDVVKLIWHGFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIDµVKDUHKROGHU
YDOXH¶PRGHO7KHLQWHUHVWVRIVKDUHKROGHUVKDYHEHHQHOHYDWHGDERYHWKRVHRIRWKHU
stakeholders including workers. Pressurized by financial markets to maximize short-term 
profits and to raise dividends for shareholders, managers have looked to reduce wages, lay-
RIIZRUNHUVDQGGRZQVL]HSURGXFWLRQ/D]RQLFNDQG2¶6XOOLYDQ)URXGet al., 2006; 
Thompson, 2011). They have also entered into mergers that invariably have led to reduced 
levels of wages and employment (Glyn, 2006, pp.64-5). The simultaneous growth of private 
equity investors that have bought and sold productive assets, in addition, has resulted in 
poorer employment outcomes for workers (Clark, 2009).   
 
The third issue relates to the impact of the global financial crisis on work. The crisis has its 
origins in the financialization process and among its outcomes has been a decline in 
employment, job security, wages, and working conditions. Already weakened by 
financialization, workers have faced a further reduction in their bargaining power due to 
rising unemployment and fiscal consolidation. As mature capitalist economies confront a 
future of slower growth rates, there is little chance of any quick turnaround in the fortunes of 
workers. Indeed, the responses made by governments and governmental organisations at the 
national and international level to the crisis are making life more difficult for workers (Heyes 
et al,QWKHQDPHRIµDXVWHULW\¶ all kinds of regressive policies have been 
implemented from reductions in the availability of out-of-work benefits through cuts in 
public services to the repeal of labor laws. These policies have been pursued with the backing 
of  business and against the demands of organized labor.    
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Fourthly, and relating to the discussion in the previous section, financialization impedes the 
adoption and sustainability of forms of participatory work practices that rely on the elicitation 
of commitment and flexibility from workers. Despite their perceived economic benefits, as 
mentioned above, these practices have not been adopted to any great extent (Godard, 2004), 
in part because they represent too high a cost for firms, but also because they pose a 
FKDOOHQJHWRHPSOR\HUV¶µULJKWWRPDQDJH¶. Where they have been implemented, employers 
KDYHIRXQGLWKDUGWRNHHSWKHLUVLGHRIWKHµEDUJDLQ¶7KRPSVRQ7KRPSVRQ
2011) has pointed to the fragility and non-VXVWDLQDELOLW\RIµKLJKSHUIRUPDQFH¶practices 
under conditions where managers are under pressure from financial stakeholders to maximise 
shareholder value. Managers demand commitment and flexibility from workers but their 
drive to maximize shareholder value means that they cannot maintain the conditions required 
to secure the continued cooperation of workers. Financialization, in this sense, undermines 
WKHDELOLW\RIHPSOR\HUVWRVXVWDLQµKLJKSHUIRUPDQFH¶practices and produces tendencies 
towards harsher forms of human resource management based on coercion. The repeal of labor 
laws in the era of austerity has further undermined the conditions of security and commitment 
needed for workplace practices of involvement and commitment. 
 
The process of financialization has clearly weakened the bargaining power of labor. In terms 
of the discussion of this paper, it has added to the tendency for employers to use short-term 
measures to control workers and has reduced the scope for the adoption of alternative 
methods of labor management that rely on eliciting the cooperation of workers. 
Financialization, in short, has increased rather than diminished the role of unemployment and 
the threat of job loss as regulators of wages and labor productivity. Its ultimate effect has 
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been to entrench insecurity in the workplace, backed by unemployment in the wider 
economy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The relation between unemployment and labor productivity has received less attention from 
economists than it should. As this paper has argued, this relation is central to understanding 
whether unemployment is achievable or not. The nihilistic view found in efficiency wage 
theory is that unemployment is necessary and inevitable to combat the shirking behaviour of 
workers. On this view, high unemployment is always needed to secure high labor 
productivity. A more progressive perspective contained in heterodox economics is that high 
unemployment is just one way to secure high labor productivity. If high unemployment is 
being relied upon to secure high labor productivity, then this reflects the action of employers 
and means the forgoing of other methods of achieving high labor productivity that do not 
entail high unemployment and its associated economic and human costs.  
 
The ideas of Kalecki fit this second view. Only by undergoing µfundamental reform¶, argued 
Kalecki, could capitalism accommodate the goal of full employment. µ)XOOHPSOR\PHQW
FDSLWDOLVP¶Kalecki wroteUHTXLUHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIµQHZVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
which will reflect the increased power of the working class. If capitalism can adjust itself to 
IXOOHPSOR\PHQWDIXQGDPHQWDOUHIRUPZLOOKDYHEHHQLQFRUSRUDWHGLQLW¶.DOHcki, 1943, 
p.331). Capitalism, in essence, had to find a way to accommodate the competing the claims 
of capital and labor without the necessity for unemployment.  
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Kalecki, while vague on the details, hinted at several reforms that could help to achieve and 
maintain full employment under capitalism. These included a co-ordinated system of wage 
bargaining based on the establishment of consensus over the distribution of income between 
wages and profits: this had the particular advantage of accommodating inflationary pressures 
at full employment. Other reforms included the reorganisation of work including the 
introduction of some form of worker democracy. By creating a more democratic system of 
work, workers and employers could reach a compromise over the distribution of income; they 
could also agree on ways to secure high labor productivity without the back-up threat of 
unemployment. µ'LVFLSOLQHLQWKHIDFWRULHV¶WKXVFRXOGEHPDLQWDLQHGDWIXOOHPSOR\PHQW
under a reformed and more democratic work regime. 
 
Innovations in worker involvement have shown that there are different routes to sustaining 
workplace productivity. However, this paper has also indicated how broad the reform agenda 
QHHGVWREHWRDFKLHYH.DOHFNL¶VDLP1RWRQO\GRHVWKHLQGXVWULDOUHODWLRns system need 
reform, so too does the system of employment law and, crucially the relations between 
finance and industry. The present dominant pressures of financialization ± undimmed despite 
the global financial crisis ± are a fundamental block to any reform agenda. With a globalized, 
finance-dominated capitalism this task is all the harder. It does not, however, make it any less 
urgent. Whether, though, capitalism can accommodate full employment remains to be seen. 
In this sense, Marx may be right once again. 
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